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IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE IN MINE CLOSURE:
THE CASE FOR A SYSTEM OF PERFORMANCE BONDS
Dina Franceschi
Department of Economics - Fairfield University
James R Kahn
Environmental Studies Program and Department of Economics - Washington and Lee
University
Lexington, VA 24450
I) INTRODUCTION
The mining sector presents an interesting challenge in terms of reducing its
environmental impacts. Environmental impacts include the emissions of pollutants during
the period that mining takes place, transformation of the landscape and the creation of
conditions that can lead to environmental problems in the future. Although mining has
traditionally been regulated by specifying a set of restrictions on mining activity, this system
has not been particularly successful in terms of maintaining environmental quality in areas
where mining is currently taking place and in areas where mining activity has been
concluded. Although there certainly are examples of mining activity which has been done in
a careful, environmentally protective fashion, this is generally the exception. As a
consequence, it is essential that we develop a set of new environmental policy tools with
which to transform mining into an activity which yields a smaller ecological footprint.
We suggest performance bonding as a policy tool that has the potential to
contribute to the solution of the problem. A performance bond refers to a sum of money that
is collected from the firm or individual before the potentially damaging activity begins. The
money is typically held by the government or a third party (such as an NGO or in an escrow
account at a commercial bank) and returned only if the activity concludes within the
established restrictions. Although performance bonding has traditionally been used to
ensure the restoration of surface mining areas in countries such as the United States and
Canada, it has been a narrowly constructed environmental policy. First, it has only focused
on the restoration of damages rather than the prevention of damages. Second, it has tends
to focus on ensuring a minimum level of environmental quality rather than an optimal
environmental policy. Third, it tends to be a discrete instrument, constructed as an “all or
nothing” type of control. If the target or restrictions are only slightly violated, the entire bond
is forfeited. In addition, there is no reward for exceeding the minimum level.
This paper develops a method which overcomes some of these limitations,
transforming the performance bond into a continuous instrument that is capable of
preventing damages. Section 2 discusses the structure of the proposed performance
bonding system, highlighting its conceptual basis, its theoretical properties, and how it can
be adapted to a broad set of environmental needs. Section 3 highlights environmental
problems associated with mining in general, with a specific emphasis on mine closure. The
section also shows the correspondence between these environmental issues associated
with mining and mine closure and the performance bonding system outlined in Section 2.
Section 4 provides a demarcation of the dimensionality of these problems both
geographically and temporally. Difficulties engendered by temporal and geographical
separation are solved by showing how an insurance system can be dovetailed with a
performance bonding system. Section 5 details an example of the use of environmental
bonding in a hypothetical mine closure example. Section 6 applies the performance
bonding system to the artisanal and subsistence sectors of the economy, an area which
has proved very difficult to handle with conventional environmental policies.
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II) STRUCTURE OF A PERFORMANCE BONDING SYSTEM
The proper structure of a performance bonding system will be predicated on the
relationship between social welfare and ecological services.i A reasonable interpretation of
this relationship occurs in Figure 1, where social welfare increases at a decreasing rate as
the level of ecological services are increasing. An important observation is that most of the
social benefits of increasing the level of ecological services occurs before one reaches the
level of services associated with a pristine ecosystem, which is E1 in Figure 1.
A similar relationship exists between ecosystem health and ecological services.
This relationship is depicted in Figure 2. However, from a policy perspective one might want
to focus on key ecological characteristics which contribute to ecological health, since
ecosystem health is an outcome rather than a choice or control variable. The relationship
between an ecological characteristic and ecosystem health is contained in Figure 3. Note
that in this depiction, the ecosystem crashes as the level of the ecological characteristic
approaches a low, but positive levelii. The three relationships in Figures 1-3 can be linked to
derive a functional relationship between social welfare and a key ecological characteristic.
This is done in Figure 4, forming the basis for structuring a performance bonding system.
This relationship can be viewed as measuring the total social benefits (TB) of the ecological
characteristic. TC represents the total costs of obtaining the ecological characteristic, and is
presented in this graph as a linear function. The linearity of the cost function is chosen
solely for ease of exposition, and does not represent a hypothesis concerning the shape of
the function.
Ecological
Services

Ecosystem
Health

1 The Relationship Between Ecosystem Health and Ecological

Social
Welfare

E1

Ecological
Services

Services
2 The Relationship Between Ecological Services and Social
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Ecosystem
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Ecological
Characteristic
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3 The Relationship Between an Ecological Characteristic and Ecosystem
Social
Welfare

TC
TB
TC1
C1

Ecological
Characteristic

Health
4 The Minimum Acceptable Level of the Ecological Characteristic
In the
traditional performance bonding system, where one seeks to stay above a minimum
acceptable level of environmental quality, C1 would make a good candidate for the
definition of the standard. The definition of a level such as C1 allows one to remain above
the collapse point, with an adequate margin of safety to guard against uncertainty
associated with either measurement error or stochastic events.iii
To assure that the level of the ecological characteristic remains above C1, the
magnitude must exceed TC1, the cost to the firm of maintaining the ecological characteristic
at a level of C1. The amount by which the performance bond should exceed TC1 will be a
function of the firm’s perception of the probability of forfeiture from violating the standard
(the expected value must exceed TC1) and also will be related to the existence of random
variables or measurement error in the total cost function.
However, as mentioned in the introduction, this system does not move society
towards the optimal level of the characteristic. The optimal level of the ecological
characteristic would be C2 in Figure 5, where the marginal cost of obtaining the
characteristic is equal to the marginal benefit of the characteristic. In this case, the
magnitude of the performance bond must exceed TC2 in order to generate the optimal level
of the characteristic.
Returning the Performance Bond
If one is only interested in maintaining the minimum acceptable level of
environmental quality the procedure for returning the performance bond is relatively straight
forward. The bondis returned if the minimum acceptable level is exceeded, and forfeited if
the minimum acceptable level is not attained.
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5 The Optimal Level of the Ecological Characteristic
Unfortunately, a corresponding procedure will not work well if the optimal level of
the characteristic is the policy target. The reason for this is that if the whole performance
bond is forfeited for missing the optimal level of the characteristic, the firm will have no
further incentive to maintain environmental quality, and will allow it to decline towards zero.
When focusing on the optimal level of quality, there should be a small penalty for being
slightly below the optimal level, and large penalties for being far below the optimal level.
This structuring of penalties is very important given that the total benefit function is
increasing at a decreasing rate, and is likely to be relatively flat in the vicinity of the optimal
level of the ecological characteristic. If the total benefit function is known (or if an estimate
of the total benefit function is available) then a continuous function of returning the
performance bond can be developed as in Equation (1). This function specifies the fraction
of the performance bond which is returned, where TB2 is the level of total benefits
associated with the optimal level of the ecological characteristic, TB1 is the level of total
benefits associated with the minimum acceptable level of the ecological characteristic, and
TBx is the actual level of the environmental characteristic at which the firm leaves the
effected area.
P =

TBx − TB1
TB2 − TB1

(1)

If TBx = TB1 (where TB1 equals the total benefit associated with the minimum
acceptable level of the ecological characteristic), then the numerator of Equation (1) will be
equal to zero, and all of the performance bond will be forfeited. If TBx = TB2 (where TB2
equals, the total benefit associated with the optimal level of the characteristic), the
numerator of Equation (1) will equal the denominator, and all of the performance bond will
be returned. As one moves from C1 to C2, the proportion of the performance bond which is
returned increases at a decreasing rate, according to the slope of the benefit function, as
illustrated in Equation (2).


1
dP dTBx 


=
dC
dC  TB2 − TB1 

(2)

III) ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MINE CLOSURE
Mine closure presents a whole host of potentially long term environmental effects
that must be addressed preferably prior to the beginning of mine operation. Most mining
firms committed to environmental compliance have found that if the issues are identified
and addressed early in the process while recovery efforts are made throughout the life of
the mine, environmental mitigation costs can be minimized. In this case, if environmental
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compliance is sought throughout, there is no reason to believe that the environmental bond
should not be returned in its entirety.
Probably the most significant environmental concern with regard to mine closure is
the land surface alteration and degradation that occurs due to mining operations.
Reclamation efforts vary for every mine depending on such variables as soil type, contour
slope, climate, predominant ecosystem, including preexisting vegetation and wildlife, as
well as others. For most mining types, many of the issues associated with mining and land
alteration are caused by the mining process itself. The clearing of property and then
moving of massive amounts of overburden result in a substantially different topography
than had originally occurred on site. Although often times, costs prohibit returning a mine
site to the original landscape, efforts are usually required of the firm to integrate the site
back into the primary, self-sustaining ecosystem that existed on site before operation
began. A key component of mine site reclamation is the choice of proper vegetation and
medium term care of the revegetation efforts. Vegetation selection will impact almost every
aspect of site reclamation, especially the mitigation of erosion and the return of wildlife.
In addition to land use, both water and air quality are of concern during the postmining phase. After pit and plant closure, the primary source of air pollution is a result of
the increase in dust particles caused by soil erosion and transport. (During mine operation,
dust, heavy metal particulates, toxins and other noxious pollutants can plague mining and
beneficiation processes. These emission are reduced after production ceases when
studies have shown ambient concentrations to diminish.) Proper dust suppression
techniques, when employed through the production and closure phases of operation can
minimize the extent to which post mine damage impacts the surrounding community. Here
again, proper revegetation, as well as careful slope contour, can maximize air quality.
Water quality is often compromised during mine operation on site and downstream
of production facilities. Issues can vary, depending on mine type. The major problems
include acid mine drainage, sedimentation, groundwater disruption, ground or surface water
movement and availability disruptions, and toxic leachates. Water control and treatment
can occur both in-process and/or end-of-pipe. Technology to mitigate or recycle waters
contaminated by effluent wastes, e.g., simple sediment or metals, from production
processes is well developed. The minimization of water discharged from the system
reduces impacts by limiting either sediments or toxins from entering a local water flow.
Surface water runoff can be mitigated by erosion control techniques. The issue of tailing
pond leakage or evaporation however, is a more difficult problem. Potentially hazardous
effluent discharge, e.g., cyanide effluent, in the case of gold mining, requires careful
monitoring and quick response. Any of these issues during mine operation can cause high
concentration of effluents which complicate cleanup, closure and bond return.
One of the most common post production water quality concern is acid mine
drainage. Water percolates through an abandoned mine site, carrying away any number of
mining related contaminants. Careful long term monitoring of the mine site and water
testing is necessary to prevent heavy loads of contaminants entering local water flows.
Mine site pumping to keep water from collecting in mine sites and/or treatment of the flows
is sometimes required. Finally, long term impacts on underground aquifers from
subsidence or backfilling post-production, are also sometimes problematic.
These
occurrence can be unpredicted and also very difficult to reconcile. The environmental
bonding system proposed can include a lagged return period, where the bond monies are
returned over the course of several years, post production, to facilitate medium and long
term monitoring.
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Above all the most crucial and complicated component of environmental concern
associated with the mining process is the characterization and evaluation of potential
impacts before they occur, prior to mine operation. The EIS (environmental impact
statement), required in most countries’ environmental regulations, facilitates the inventory
of existing environmental assets and estimates potential problems and conflicts between
the mine operation and the surrounding ecosystem This process is key to the accurate
assessment of the environmental bond. In the mine closure phase of production, the
challenge is to meet the prescribed environmental quality standards set out by the EIS,
while still remaining within production cost limitations. Of course, the bond is designed to
ensure that funds are available for clean up in the event that the firm defaults on their
promise.
IV) DEMARCATION OF ISSUES
There are a set of related environmental issues associated with mining and mine
closure. First, there are environmental problems associated with mining as the actual
mining takes place. These include run-off of sediment, acidified waters and other types of
emissions. Second, there are issues of alteration of the landscape and its impact on the
ability of the impacted environmental systems to provide ecological services. Both of these
types of problems can be adequately handled by performance bonds exclusively, or in
combination with other environmental policies such as pollution taxes or direct controls.
However, the same statement can not be made with respect to environmental problems
associated with mine closure.
The reason that mine closure is more difficult to regulate is temporal in origin. The
mine closure must leave the mine and the surrounding environment in a condition that
minimizes present and future problems. However, this condition is not self-perpetuating and
additional steps may be necessary to maintain this condition long after the mine has been
closed. For example, tailing pond dams need maintenance, aquifers must be protected
against leakages from waste disposal and contaminated areas, and formerly disturbed
areas must be protected from invasion by exotic species.
The first step in the process is therefore to define the set of conditions at which the
closed mine and the surrounding environment must be left. A performance bond can then
be used to ensure that the closed mine and surrounding area are left at or near their
optimal condition. However, the performance bond can not be used to assure the continued
maintenance of these conditions over time, as the performance bond would have already
been returned to the mining firm and could not provide any additional incentive. Since the
conditions would have to be maintained in perpetuity, an additional performance bond could
not work as there would be no logical termination point at which point to return the
performance bond. Therefore, a second policy instrument must be developed to generate
incentives for maintaining the site, protecting tailing pond dams, and rectifying any potential
hazards or problems which develop over time.
There are several options which are available to provide this long term protection
which are all designed to give either the mining firm or a contracted third party the
incentives to provide the long-term protection. One potential policy would be just to
establish liability for future environmental damages, where mining firms would be legally
required to pay damages to society (through the government) and to individuals if and when
future environmental damages occur. This is not likely to be a very good policy because
firms may have planning horizons that are shorter than socially optimal, so they may not
adequately include the possibility of future damages in today’s decision to maintain the
quality of the closed sight. Additionally, firms to not have infinite economic life, and if firms
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disappear there is no one to maintain the quality of the site. Note that this is a very different
situation than that of establishing legal liability for oil spills. Since oil transportation is always
a contemporaneous activity, the firms always have an incentive to maintain appropriate
safety levels.
Another possibility would be for firms to be required to by a permanent insurance
policy which would insure against environmental damages from the mine site. Insurance
companies would then use part of the premium payments (or one time capital payment that
they receive) to hire a third party to maintain the closed mine site. Note that this policy not
only generates the maintenance after closure, but it also provides the mining company
additional incentives to leave the mine in a good condition at closure. The reason for this is
that the better the condition of the closed mine and its surrounding environment, the lower
the payment that the insurance company would require.
A similar type of policy would be to require the firms to establish a fund which could
then be used to pay a third party to maintain the site. This would not be as easy a process,
because the government would have to estimate the potential hazards, maintenance
require to minimize risk, and so on in order to determine the size of the fund. This would be
a similar exercise to establishing the magnitude of the performance bond. Although this
could certainly work, it might be better to rely on the market forces and the greater incentive
that insurance companies would have to oversee the maintenance process in order to
minimize their chances of having to pay an insurance claim from environmental failure of
the closed mine.
V) AN EXAMPLE FROM MINE RECLAMATION
In Amazonia, the concerns surrounding mining operations are much the same as in
the United States. Land contour degradation, habitat destruction, water contamination and
toxic soil seepage top the list. Much of Brazilian environmental policy related to mining is
similar to U.S. policy. CONAMA (National Environmental Council) Resolution # 001/86
(amended 009/90 and 010/90) requires an Environmental Impact Assessment prior to
commencing mining activity.
Constitutional Decree # 99.274/90 authorizes state
environmental agencies to obtain licenses from all mining firms regarding mine planning,
environmental control planning during operation, and recovery of degraded areas. This
decree also authorizes specialty agencies to license operators in highly sensitive
environmental regions, e.g., IBAMA (Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable
Resources) has specific requirements for mining in the Legal Amazon. Finally, Decree #
97.632/89 requires all firms to submit a Plan for Recovery of Degraded Areas to be
approved by the state environmental agency. Federal, state and municipal governments
are charged with carrying out these regulations, however, monitoring in most cases is often
difficult with agencies severely underfunded. Environmental bonds are sometimes, but
infrequently used to ensure environmental compliance.
First, because of the nature of mining operations there is the potential for many
more environmental damages to occur (heavy metal leachate, acid mine drainage,
particulate emissions, etc.) during the period of operation than in other extractive industries.
Second, because of the huge amount of land mass that is moved during a mining project, it
is possible that the land area impacted can never be returned to its original ecological state
or land use. Success of a reclaimed area then might be the return of as much of the land
area to its initially determined baseline state before mining began, while providing some
alternative ecological use with the land that cannot be completely restored.
In the rain forest, the issue of tree and vegetation clearing takes on a greater
importance than in many other ecosystem types, as all of the nutrients in this type of
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ecosystem are stored in the living biomass. Virtually none of the nutrients are stored in the
soil. Therefore, replacing the soil and haphazardly planting after mine closure is simply not
enough. For a similar style of ecosystem to recover after mining activities are completed,
care must be taken in both restoring the nutrient cycle and recreating a distribution of
species similar to the original forest system. This is important because the correct habitat
must exist to support the animals which in turn are essential to the dispersal of tree seeds
that perpetuate the biodiversity of flora.
To ensure the return of environmental quality in this region, the bonding
mechanism can be an extremely useful tool. First, we will assume that all of the land can
be restored to forest after mining activities cease. If this is the case, a performance bond
based on a specialized ecological ratio could enhance the success rate of reclamation
activities. This ratio would be conceptually similar to the one defined for the forestry
example, except the reclamation process would be dependent on replanting, rather than
natural regeneration, because the process of mining would not leave long narrow strips of
cleared area that would naturally regenerate.
Criteria used for measuring success of a revegetation project could include:
- the vegetative biomass
- the distribution of tree species
- soil quality (fertility and stability)
- general biodiversity (perhaps measured at a future monitoring date) (Leitch, 1992).
- number of days per year in which fruit can be found in the tract.iv
These characteristics could then be formulated into a recovery index (either
weighted or unweighted) and then incorporated into a proportionality function in the fashion
of Equation (1). Instead of a single ecological characteristic, the proportionality function
would be based on the actual level of the recovery index (RIx), the optimal level of the index
(RI2) , and the minimum acceptable level of the index (RI1), as in Equation (3).

P=

RI x − RI 1
RI 2 − RI 1

(3)

Although the above method would give a mining firm an incentive to restore the
forest, in many cases, this is not technically and/or economically feasible. For example, if a
large open mine pit were required to be back filled for reforestation purposes, the mine
might in fact turn out to be economically infeasible. Backfilling effectively doubles the cost
of a mining project. Instead, a restoration plan could construct an alternative land use for
the portion of the mine land that is not recoverable to the baseline state.
Perhaps the largest pit in a project is slated to become a natural lake, allowing it to
fill with seasonal rain water that over time will accumulate. With careful, periodic monitoring
of the water quality in the lake, this source of water could provide a set of ecological
services (albeit different from those provided by the rainforest) as well as economic
services (tourism, commercial fishing, irrigation) and recreational services to area residents.
In the area that is not thought to be recoverable back to the forest baseline, a
functionality index will weight the potential of this land’s contribution to the forest
ecosystem, based on possible ecological values of the area and/or anthropocentric use
values. This functionality index would vary substantially based on potential alternative uses.
In this example, functionality indicators could include
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- water quality of the lake (dissolved oxygen, pH, absence of toxic metals and other
contaminants)
- water quality downstream of the lake (dissolved oxygen, pH, absence of toxic metals and
other contaminants)
- reproductive success of aquatic organisms
- growth rate of aquatic organisms
- biodiversity of flora and fauna in the area surrounding the lake
- aesthetic value and cohesiveness with original ecosystem of the surrounding area
-recreational quality of the area
The functionality index can be similarly incorporated into a proportionality function:

P=

FI x − FI 1
FI 2 − FI 1

(4)

Implementation of a Performance Bonding System in Mining
The first step in the process of implementation of a performance bonding system in
a mining context is for the government to decide upon (or the government and the mining
firm to agree upon) a restoration plan. This plan would determine which areas of the mining
tract would be restored to its original state, and which areas would be restored to some
other function.
For the area that is designated to be restored to forest, the first step would be to
identify the components of the recovery index, and weights (if any) to be assigned to these
components. Next, a performance bond would be established of a magnitude equal to the
cost of obtaining the optimal level of the recovery index, RI2. The performance bond would
then be returned based on the proportionality function of Equation (3).
For the area that is designated to be an alternative land use, the first step would be
to identify the components of the functionality index, and associated weights (if any).
Similarly, a performance bond would be established equal to the cost of attaining the
optimal functionality index, FI2. As with the recovery performance bond, the functionality
bond would be returned according to the proportionality function, in this case, Equation (4).
Monitoring
In the United States, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
establishes a system of enforcement and monitoring of environmental compliance both
during mine operation and after mine closure. During the environmental inspections, all
environmental damage mitigation techniques and environmental recovery indicators are
inspected for quality. In the reclamation phase, the factors listed above included in the
reclamation quality index can be easily tested as the reclamation process moves forward.
Usually, a lag of five years or so is added to the end of mine closure in determining the date
for full bond return. This allows environmental auditors to determine if the revegetation
procedures have resulted in the beginnings of a healthy recovery of the surrounding forest
and vegetation.
This type of hands-on monitoring, however effective, is understood to be a costly
aspect of enforcement. These additional costs are the primary reason that environmental
monitoring and compliance is so sporadic in many parts of the world. However, if the costs
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of monitoring are incorporated into the original license fee or into royalty payments, the
system can work even in developing countries that typically have under-funded
enforcement agencies.
VI) USE OF PERFORMANCE BONDS IN THE SUBSISTENCE AND ARTISANAL SECTOR
We define subsistence activities to include economic activities conducted by
families primarily to provide goods for their own consumption. Although some of the
production my be sold in markets, the market activity represents a small proportion of total
production. In contrast, market sales are the primary focus of artisanal producers. Artisanal
producers tend to be small scale operators, with low stocks of capital and unsophisticated
technologies in comparison to the corporate sector. Entry and exit from the artisanal
industries can be very rapid, for example, the number of artisanal gold miners in the
Amazon region varies from 100,000 to 800,000, depending on the price of gold. Examples
of artisanal activities include quarrying activities, production of gem stones, gold mining
activities, small dairies and ranches, and fabrication of products from recycled materials.
Although subsistence activities and artisanal activities are quite different, they
share some common characteristics which increase the difficulty of enforcing environmental
policy. For example, both subsistence and artisanal activities often don't appear on the
economic "radar screen" and thus are extremely difficult to monitor. In addition, this lack of
visibility and extreme mobility in combination with an absence of, or small amount, of fixed
assets makes enforcement of environmental fines quite difficult, as it is difficult to fine
someone who has no money or visible assets to seize. In addition, there is the very difficult
ethical issue of penalizing people who already suffer from poverty. These same
characteristics also make the development of a performance bond (with the structure
suggested above) very difficult.
However, rather than focusing on penalizing these small scale producers for
improper environmental performance, the system we are proposing in this section of the
paper would reward these producers for proper environmental performance. The proposed
system, which we will call a performance bonus system, can be structured to reduce the
problem of encouraging entry.
First, let's look at the case of an artisanal activity, such as the mining of ornamental
stone for building facades5 or wildcat (garimpo) mining of gold.6 Quarrying activities can
lead to environmental impacts such as water pollution associated with residues from stone
cutting, dumping of waste rock, and noise pollution, while garimpo mining of gold can lead
to mercury pollution, sedimentation of the water, and other pollution problem. Yet these
artisanal firms are difficult to regulate because of the characteristics described above. A
performance bonus can be established as follows. First, decide the periodicity and
magnitude of the bonus. The bonus should exceed the cost of environmental compliance,
and we will call this level, "Z." Instead of requiring the firm to post a bond equal to Z, the
firm is required to post a bond equal to Z (where 0<Z<1) and the government and/or NGOs
contribute an amount equal to (1-)Z to an escrow account. This contribution is called the
performance bonus.
Then, a proportionality function analogous to Equation (1) should be chosen based
on the environmental risks associated with this mining activity. Performance will determine
both the amount of the bond which is returned to the firm and the amount of the bonus
which is awarded to the firm. For example, if environmental performance is below the
minimum acceptable level of performance, the firm forfeits the Z it provided as a
performance bond and also forfeits access to the (1- )Z that the government and/or NGOs
have made available as a performance bonus. If the artisanal firm's environmental
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performance is at the optimal level, it receives all of the Z bond back, plus all of the (1- )Z
that is available as a performance bonus. For levels of environmental performance between
the minimum acceptable level and the optimal level, a proportionality function of the nature
of Equation (1) can be used to determine the proportion of both Z and
(1- )Z that is awarded for the firm.
Additional discussion is needed of the proper determination of the magnitude of Z.
Two factors can be identified which should be considered in the determination of this level.
First, the greater the value of the firm's assets, the greater should be Z. Second, there is
the need to discourage the entry of firms who enter the industry for the purpose of
collecting the performance bonus. The greater the potential for the performance bonus
system to encourage the entrance of firms, the greater should be to provide a
corresponding disincentive.
VII) CONCLUSION
Performance bonds can be very useful tools for achieving specific environmental
quality standards if constructed properly. We have discussed a methodology that provides
those using performance bonds more precision in the disincentives they give to those
creating environmental damages. The approach taken here is directed at promoting
environmental damage prevention activities since many damages are irreversible and since
prevention of damages is often less costly than restoration. It also strives to achieve the
optimal level of environmental quality, as opposed to the typical minimum acceptable level.
This base minimum level is often the goal of restoration activities as it ensures complete
return of the bond. However, there is no incentive (and in fact likely that additional costs
would be incurred, a significant disincentive) in meeting any higher environmental
standards with this system. Additionally, structuring this mechanism as a continuous tool so
that action can be taken and compensation can be paid according to a variety of different
levels of mitigating activity creates a clearer incentive system allowing for a balance
between the marginal costs and benefits of environmental preservation (or restoration,
where that is the goal).
Although traditionally performance bonds have been used most frequently and
somewhat effectively in the mining industry, with a few adjustments bonds can be an
effective regulatory tools in many other applications. By instituting a bonding system before
disturbance activities begin, regulatory agencies can provide strong assurance that steps
will be taken to either prevent damages or restore an area, depending on the policy goal.
The efficiency of the system of performance bonding described above increases
with the more that is known about the relationship between social welfare and ecological
indicators. While we have good knowledge of this for some ecosystems, more research
must be done before the system can be widely employed in its most efficient form. The
performance bonding system can still be employed without a knowledge of this functional
relationship (based on Equation (1)) but it is less efficient in maximizing social welfare.
Even with the current gap in scientific knowledge, integrating estimates of these more
comprehensive characteristics of the relationship between social welfare and ecosystem
health into performance bonding systems makes bonding a more effective and readily
evolving regulatory tool.
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See Kahn and O’Neill (1999) for a discussion of the policy relevance and
ecological origins of this type of bifurcation or threshold.
See Bishop (1978) for a discussion of the concept of a minimum safe standard.
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